This paper investigates whether a foreign primary listing is associated with corporate governance bonding of PRC firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore. Consistent with bonding theory, there is a significant difference between the corporate governance quality of PRC firms with a foreign primary listing and counterparts with a domestic primary listing only (i.e. the PRC benchmark). The corporate governance quality of PRC foreign primary listing firms is not significantly different from foreign market benchmarks. The association between the foreign primary listing and corporate governance quality holds when firm characteristics are controlled for. Findings from this paper contribute to the cross listing literature by providing direct evidence on the corporate governance bonding associated with PRC foreign primary listings.
Introduction
Motivations driving firms to list on a foreign stock exchange have drawn intensive scholarly attention in recent years. The traditional explanation (e.g. Alexander et al., 1987; Miller 1999 ) is that firms list overseas to access foreign capital, increase liquidity, reduce cost of capital or improve firm visibility (Karolyi, 2006 ). An emerging explanation, bonding theory (Coffee, 1999 (Coffee, , 2002 Stulz, 1999) , posits that firms seek to enhance corporate governance by linking to stronger foreign regimes. Advocates of bonding theory (e.g., Coffee, 1999 Coffee, , 2002 Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Stulz, 1999) argue that a firm may elect to list on a foreign exchange in a nation with higher legal, disclosure, accounting and enforcement standards to signal a higher level of shareholder protection, so as to attract investors that would otherwise be unwilling to invest. A number of recent studies (e.g. Charitou and Louca, 2009; Doidge, 2004 ; Lel and Miller, 2008) provide empirical evidence in support of bonding theory.
Whilst papers supporting bonding theory generate ample evidence, several questions remain unanswered. Firstly, virtually all existing studies restrict the examination of bonding based on crosslistings. Other overseas listing paths are not examined. Secondly, the majority of the current literature overly dwells on firms cross listing on the developed markets especially the U.S. (Ferris et al., 2009 ). It is not clear whether bonding theory is applicable in a broader setting such as a firm from a poor institutional regime listing on a more reputed market. Thirdly, although bonding theory derives from corporate governance, most of the bonding papers are based on the capital market evidence of the bonding effect (Ferris et al., 2009) . Direct tests on how cross listing affects a firm's corporate governance quality are very rare.
Motivated by the gaps in the literature, this paper examines whether overseas listing leads to higher corporate governance quality using firms from the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC). PRC firms are chosen because of a unique listing path, foreign primary listing, associated with these firms. The traditional cross listing follows the path that firms establish their primary listings on a domestic stock exchange before they conduct a secondary listing on a foreign exchange. In contrast, during the past two decades, a substantial and growing number of unseasoned PRC domiciled firms have established primary listings on foreign exchanges instead of either the PRC's two domestic exchanges (i.e., Shanghai Stock Exchange (hereafter SHSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (hereafter SZSE)). Indeed, by the end of 2009, PRC foreign primary listing firms comprised nearly a quarter of the approximately 1,700 PRC publicly listed firms worldwide (Zero2 IPO Research Center, 2009) 42 . To date, little research has been conducted to understand the fundamentals behind this unique listing arrangement.
The foreign primary listing phenomenon associated with PRC firms is a puzzling issue from the firm perspective. Frequently, cross-listing researchers argue firms list abroad to pursue economic benefits such as a lower cost of capital. However, prior research (Sun and Tong, 2000; Wang and Jiang, 2003) indicates H-Share firms 43 listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (hereafter HKEx) continuously trade at price discounts relative to A-and B-Share 44 firms listed on PRC domestic exchanges. If at least on the surface a foreign primary listing does not lead to a lower cost of capital, the puzzle is why PRC firms persist in establishing a primary listing on a foreign exchange.
Bonding theory provides an important avenue to explain the foreign primary listing phenomenon associated with the PRC firms. There are long [42] In developed economies such as Europe, North America and Australia, the number of firms with a foreign primary listing is less than one percent (Sun et al., 2006) . The only other substantial occurence of firms from a specific nation establishing foreign primary listings involved Israeli technology firms listing on the NASDAQ for a brief period in the 1990s (Blass and Yafeh 2001; Sun et al., 2006) . The 'Dot.Com Bubble' burst and Sarbannes-Oxley Act has virtually curtailed any further such listings by Israeli firms. Foreign primary listings by PRC firms are more sustained and widespread (i.e., involving more stock exchanges worldwide) and continue to grow. [43] Two types of shares are issued by PRC domiciled firms listed in Hong Kong -H-Share and RedChip Share. The difference between the H-Share and Red-Chip Share is that H-Shares are issued by firms incorporated in the PRC whilst Red-Chip Shares are issued by firms incorporated outside the PRC. [44] Two types of shares are listed on the PRC domestic stock exchanges -A-Share and B-Share. The difference between the A-Share and B-Share is that AShares are issued by PRC firms for PRC citizens whilst B-Shares are mainly issued for foreign investors.
lingering questions of legal, accounting, and governance standards in the PRC, whilst the corporate governance standards in Hong Kong and Singapore are generally regarded as the leaders in Asia (CLSA, 2005 (CLSA, , 2007 . This may provide an impetus for a substantial number of PRC firms to establish listings abroad to signal their commitment to higher corporate governance quality and reassure investors' confidence. The PRC government has long acknowledged that overseas listing is an important strategy to boost corporate governance of PRC firms and attract foreign investors (Sun et al., 2006) . It is, therefore, imperative to test if foreign primary listings of PRC firms lead to corporate governance bonding.
The primary research objective of this paper is to examine whether foreign primary listings are associated with corporate governance bonding of PRC firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore. PRC and foreign market benchmarks are constructed to contrast the corporate governance quality of PRC foreign primary listing firms with those benchmark firms. Data examined are firms' 2006 annual reports. The corporate governance score is calculated as the sum of twenty-four [24] corporate governance items. Results suggest that consistent with bonding theory, there is a significant difference between the corporate governance quality of PRC firms with a foreign primary listing and counterparts with a domestic primary listing only. The corporate governance quality of PRC foreign primary listing firms is not significantly different from foreign market benchmarks. The association between the foreign primary listing and corporate governance quality holds when firm characteristics are controlled for. This paper contributes to the bonding literature in several important ways. Firstly, this paper examines whether bonding theory can be applied to the unique foreign primary listing phenomenon associated with the PRC firms. Secondly, different from previous capital market based bonding studies, this paper directly exlpores whether foreign primary listings of PRC firms are associated with corporate governance bonding with foreign market standards. By comparing the corporate governance quality with both domestic and foreign market benchmarks, this paper provides a new understanding of how corporate governance might change in response to a foreign primary listing. Thirdly, this paper investigates whether quality Asian markets such as Hong Kong or Singapore can provide bonding mechanisms beyond the traditional U.S. market. This enriches the international corporate governance literature. Finally, compared with previous studies (e.g. Sun et al., 2006 ) that examine PRC overseas listings based on a small sample of H-Share firms, this study provides comprehensive empirical analysis using a large sample of PRC firms listed in Hong Kong (H-Share and Red-Chip Shares) or Singapore (S-Shares 45 ). The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of PRC foreign primary listings and contrasts investor protection enviornments in the PRC, Hong Kong and Singapore. It also develops testable hypotheses based on prior literature. Section 3 presents the research design. Section 4 reports statistical results. Concluding remarks are detailed in the last section.
Literature review and hypothesis development 2.1 PRC foreign primary listings
A firm's first Initial Public Offering (IPO) is labelled the primary listing whilst future seasoned offerings on another stock exchange are termed the secondary listing (HKEx, 2007) . For obvious reasons (e.g., locality, market base, reputational capital), the majority of firms will conduct the IPO via a domestic primary listing (Karolyi, 2006) . The firm's listing on another domestic stock exchange or a foreign stock exchange is called the domestic secondary listing and foreign secondary listing respectively. A domestic primary -foreign secondary listing composition is generally perceived as the traditional cross-listing arrangement (Karolyi, 2006) . Whilst not common, a firm may conduct the IPO on a foreign exchange, thereby, creating a foreign primary listing. Any subsequent listing on a domestic stock exchange is termed a domestic secondary listing. The establishment of a foreign primary -domestic secondary listing composition gives rise to a reverse cross-listing arrangement.
Presently, on established stock exchanges such as New York Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange, a large number of listed firms are crosslisting firms (Karolyi, 2006) . The foreign primary listing, however, only appears in the Israeli and PRC domiciled firms (Sun et al., 2006) . The Israeli foreign primary listings took place in the 1990s when a group of young and high technology firms went public on the U.S. offshore stock exchange (Blass and Yafeh, 2001 ). Nonetheless, the number of Israeli foreign primary listing firms declined quickly after the burst of the high technology bubble and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. By contrast, the foreign primary listing phenomenon of PRC firms is more sustained and widespread (i.e., involving more stock exchanges worldwide) and continues to grow (Sun et al., 2006) .
PRC firms started to list overseas since 1993. Of various overseas markets, New York was the [45] PRC domiciled firms listed in Singapore are commonly termed S-Share firms. 46 . However, the supervisory board in the PRC firms has been criticized for not functioning well and failing to identify managerial corruption (Clarke, 2003; Sun et al., 2006) . Meanwhile, the true independence of directors is questionable. As most of the dominant investors are linked to the state, the government is able to influence the appointment of independent directors (Allen et al., 2005) . Minority shareholders are able to vote on [46] The PRC adopts a quasi two-tier structure of board governance, with a board of directors and a supervisory board. It has been observed that the blending of the Anglo-Saxon model and the German model, with a duplication and overlap of functions, can create redundancy and confusion in the governance structure. It dilutes the authority of both boards and at the same time increases administrative costs for the company (Cheung et al., 2008) . major decisions but votes of the dominant investors are actually decisive (Sun et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2008) . In addition, there are few professional financial analysts in the PRC market and the role of the PRC press is very limited in monitoring the management of listed firms due to the censorship policy of the government (Eccher and Healy, 2000; Clarke, 2003) .
As the first in Asia to produce an official code of best practice (ACGA, 2007a), Hong Kong's corporate governance requirements and enforcement procedures are much stricter than the PRC (Wang and Jiang, 2003) . For example, if the controlling shareholder has an interest in a business that competes or is likely to compete (directly or indirectly) with the firm's business, the HKEx may refuse to list the firm. Meanwhile, the board of directors must include at least three independent non-executive directors who have the character, integrity, independence, and experience necessary to fulfill directorial roles on the board (Sun et al. 2006) . Apart from the basic full listing rules, HKEx has separate additional listing rules (Chap. 19A.21) for firms incorporated in mainland China (i.e. HShare firms). These requirements include the competence of independent non-executive directors and disclosure of related parties. Moreover, as a world-class stock market, there is strict scrutiny deriving from different market intermediaries such as underwriters, debt-rating agencies, and securities analysts in Hong Kong (Sun et al., 2006) .
With the legal and governance framework very much aligned to the Anglo-American model, Singapore is recognized as the leader of corporate governance in Asia (Goodwin and Seow, 2009; Mak and Chng, 2000) . A feature of the enforcement of the Singapore rules and regulations is that it links the firm's disclosure responsibilities with civil liability (Anandarajah, 2004) . For instance, whilst the Securities and Futures Act (SFA) requires firms listed on the SGX to disclose material information on a continuous basis, a failure to disclose will either constitute a criminal offence or give rise to civil liability, and not just a breach of the listing rules (ACGA, 2007b). The governance and disclosure requirements for foreign issuers in Singapore are as strict as Hong Kong. For instance, SGX requires at least two independent directors to be appointed to the audit committee for international listed firms, one of whom must be resident in Singapore on a continuing basis. In addition, Singapore also has sophisticated financial intermediaries to act as market monitors (Mak and Chng, 2000).
Bonding Theory and Hypothesis Development
Bonding theory posits that higher listing rules and stringent corporate governance standards can be 'rented' by firms domiciled in a jurisdiction with poor investor protection and enforcement systems (Coffee, 1999 (Coffee, , 2002 . Coffee (2002) explains "bonding' as the process by which a firm improves its corporate governance through cross listing on a foreign exchange with superior governance. The bonding process is viewed to work in two ways: legal and reputational bonding mechanisms (Coffee, 1999 (Coffee, , 2002 Stulz, 1999) . The legal bonding mechanism operates through the enforcement of regulatory requirements such as courts and stock exchange listing rules. The reputational bonding, meanwhile, functions via 'reputational intermediaries' such as underwriters, auditors, debt-rating agencies, securities analysts as well as listing exchanges (via listing requirements). These reputational intermediaries provide additional scrutiny or monitoring in the foreign market that is not available in the home market.
The bonding of corporate governance involves a process that firms converge upon the higher corporate governance norm of the foreign market. Whilst cross-listing firms are subject to foreign regulatory institutions, those firms will have to adapt to the mandated rules and legitimize themselves in the foreign environment for survival and legitimization (Coffee, 2002; Peng, 2004; Stulz, 1999) . To avoid criticisms from the monitoring powers (such as the listing exchange and other regulatory authorities), overseas listed firms will try to imitate local firms and to reach at least the average corporate governance level in the foreign jurisdiction. Through this process, corporate governance of cross-listed firms converges with the higher corporate governance norms in the overseas market. A cross listing on a foreign exchange with stricter regulations is, thus, used by firms to signal quality and gain credibility among investors (Coffee, 1999 (Coffee, , 2002 Doidge, 2004) .
Earlier studies supporting bonding theory mainly focus on the capital market evidence such as better valuation, lower cost of capital, more scrutiny by financial analysts, and greater access to external finance (Miller, 1999 That is, the convergence to the better corporate governance norm in the foreign market with higher standards is possible through a cross listing. Meanwhile, cross-listing firms can distinguish from the home market firms in terms of corporate governance. Compared to cross listing firms, a firm that establishes a foreign primary listing is subject to full listing requirements of the foreign exchange with no concessions. Moreover, a foreign primary listing firm normally receives more stringent scrutiny from financial analysts given it has no prior listing history. Therefore, it is [47] There are two other alternative explanations for the PRC foreign primary listings. One is the 'market order' argument (Sun et al., 2006) and the other one is 'political connection' hypothesis (Hung et al., 2008 
Research design

base sample selection
The target firms of this paper are PRC firms with a foreign primary listing on the HKEx (H-Share and Red-Chip Share) and SGX (S-Share). As a crosssectional study, 2006 is the focus year of this paper. Lists of PRC firms with foreign primary listings were obtained from the HKEx and SGX websites 48 . The entire population of the PRC domiciled firms listed on the HKEx and SGX as at 31 December 2006 were included in the initial sample. The following firms were then excluded from the initial sample: (a) listings during the 2006 calendar year; (b) delisted and reinstated during the 2006 calendar year; (c) in the financial service (including banks, [48] Unlike the HKEx that has a lengthy history of formally identifying PRC firms listed on the exchange, SShare firms have not been formally defined by any wellcited authority. SGX only recently developed the FTSE ST China index (SGX 2008). However, the FTSE ST China index merely includes a limited number of topranking S-Share firms. To generate a relatively complete list of S-Share firm, this paper identifies PRC domiciled firms listed on the SGX following rules for eligibility in the FTSE ST China Index. To ensure consistency and completeness, the S-Share list was cross-referenced against the ShareInvestor China Index (2009). financial intermediaries and insurance firms) industry; and (d) with annual reports missing. Table 1 Panel A provides a description of the base sample selection process.
Insert Table 1 about here Based on the above selection process, the final base sample comprises 99 H-Share firms, 79 Red-Chip Share firms and 97 S-Share firms.
Benchmark Sample Selection
To establish the national corporate governance standards that PRC foreign primary listing firms can compare with, the benchmark sample of each nation has to be selected. There is no one consistent benchmark of corporate governance standards in the literature. This paper uses the national average corporate governance quality of PRC, Hong Kong, and Singapore local firms 49 as the benchmarks of each market. The PRC, Hong Kong and Singapore local firms listed on the PRC stock exchanges, HKEx and SGX as of 31 December 2006 comprise the national benchmark population of each jurisdiction.
For the PRC benchmark sample, the initial population comprises all PRC A-Share 50 firms listed on the PRC domestic stock exchanges. Due to the large population of A-Share firms, 100 firms were randomly selected from its population. Consistent with the base sample, criteria for firms excluded from the initial benchmark sample are in line with the base sample. Meanwhile, 100 Hong Kong and 100 Singapore sample firms are selected from the respective local benchmark firm population. Details on the formation of the final benchmark samples are provided in Table 1 51 , board disclosures, audit committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee and ownership concentration 52 .
Insert Table 2 Table  3 provides detailed definitions of the dependent, independent and control variables.
Insert Table 3 In contrast to other firm types, less than a majority of Hong Kong and Singapore benchmark firms and Red-Chip firms are from the manufacturing industry. The past financial performance of the Hong Kong benchmark and Red-Chip firms is the worst with the average ROA of -2.42% and 0.88% respectively. Whilst almost all Red-Chip firms are engaged with a Big-4 auditor, the appointment rate for PRC benchmark firms is only 5%. The Big-4 presence for the remaining firm types is about 70%. All firm types have a leverage ratio of 40% to 60%. Finally, SShare firms have the highest growth rate of total assets (38%) whilst Singapore benchmark firms have the lowest growth ratio (8%). Table 4 Panel B reports the mean scores by breaking the CGS i,t down into six dimensions. For board characteristics, surprisingly the PRC benchmark firms have the highest average score of 3.75 out of 6.00. Specifically, the PRC benchmark firms score well in separating the CEO and chairperson role (CGS 2), holding regular meetings (CGS 4) and a reasonable board size (CGS 6). This echoes findings of prior studies such as Ke et al. (2008) , which notes that the corporate governance structure of PRC domestically listed firms resembles that of the West in recent years, although the overall effectiveness of the board is still questionable. Meanwhile, Hong Kong benchmark firms score the second highest (3.73) for board characteristics, which is moderately higher than HShare and Red-Chip Share firms (3.59 and 3.51 respectively). In addition, S-Share firms have a slightly lower mean value than Singapore benchmark firms (3.39 to 3.43).
Statistical results
Descriptive Statistics
Corporate Governance Individual Dimension Comparison
In respective of board disclosures, the average disclosure levels of both base sample firms and national benchmark firms are low. Singapore benchmark firms are the best. Nonetheless, it is a low 1.36 out of 6.00. Hong Kong benchmark firms, however, rank lowest among all firm types, especially for the integrated risk management policy (CGS 8) and formal continuous disclosure policy (CGS 10). H-Share and Red-Chip Share firms have slightly higher disclosure levels (0.74 and 0.71) than the Hong Kong benchmark (0.48), whilst the disclosures by S-Share firms and the Singapore benchmark are comparable (1.22 to 1.36).
With regard to board committees, PRC benchmark firms score much worse than other groups in terms of all three committees. Aside from the PRC benchmark firms, 100% of the other firms have an audit committee with an independent director appointed as a chair. PRC benchmark firms also rank poorly on audit committee independence (CGS 14 and 15) and diligence (CGS18). Finally, for the ownership structure, the PRC benchmark firms have lower ownership concentration than other firms, with 60% of firms score one [1] for CGS 24 (i.e. the controlling shareholder has less than 40% ownership). This might due to the share split reform of PRC firms in recent years. The ownership concentration level of H-Share firms is comparable to that of the Hong Kong benchmark (36% and 32% of firms score one [1] for CGS 24) whilst Red-Chip firms have the highest ownership concentration. This is not surprising given large PRC State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with high share concentration mainly established primary listings in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the ownership concentration level of Singapore benchmark firms is on a par with SShare firms (51% of firms score one [1] for CGS 24) .
Overall, the analysis of the individual dimensions of the corporate governance score suggests that in general the corporate governance quality of PRC foreign primary listing firms are closer to the foreign than domestic market benchmark. However, the comparability of PRC foreign primary listing firms relative to benchmarks varies across different dimensions of the corporate governance score.
Tests of means
This section reports the parametric tests-of-means to determine if the average CGS i,t of PRC firms with a foreign primary listing differ significantly from national benchmarks.
Insert Table 5 about here Table 5 Panel C presents the independent t-test results comparing the average CGS i,t of S-Shares relative to Singapore and PRC benchmarks. The CGS i,t of S-Share firms is significantly different from the PRC benchmark (p<0.01). In contrast, the difference between CGS i,t values of S-Share and the Singapore benchmark is insignificant. Table 6 presents the Pearson correlations for  Equation 1 54 . As indicated in Table 6 , the highest
Pearson Correlations
The correlation analysis is conducted for all three equations. For brevity, only the correlations for Equation 1 are reported in this paper. Results for Equations 2 and 3 also reveal that multicollinearity is not a serious concern in the cross-sectional regression analysis.
correlation is between the leverage and ROA (-0.34, p<0.05), which is below the deemed critical level for multicollinearity (i.e., 0.8, see Hair et al., 1995; Field, 2009) . Therefore, multicollinearity is not considered a serious concern in the crosssectional regression analysis. The additional check of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores reveals that the highest VIF does not exceed the critical level either, which further indicates no serious multicollinearity problems.
Insert Table 6 about here
Multiple Regression Results
The multiple regression results are reported in Table 7 . Equation 1 includes all firm types in the regression. Equation 2 only includes H-Share, RedChip Share, Hong Kong benchmark and PRC benchmark firms. Equation 3 only includes SShare, PRC benchmark and Singapore benchmark firms.
Insert Table 7 about here
As reflected in Table 7 Panel A, Equation 1 is overall useful with the F-statistic highly significant (F<0.01). The adjusted R-Square value is high of 53%. The coefficients on the HSh i,t , RC i,t and SSh i,t are positively significant at the 1% confidence level. This indicates that consistent with the t-test results, the average CGS i,t values of H-Share, RedChip and S-Share firms are all significantly higher than the PRC benchmark. Therefore, H1a, H1b and H1c are supported. Meanwhile, the coefficients on the HKBch i,t and SGBch i,t are also positively significant (p<0.01), which is in line with the t-test results that the corporate governance quality of Hong Kong and Singapore benchmarks is significantly higher than the PRC benchmarks. As for control variables, firm size and auditor type are positively associated with the CGS i,t at the 10% confidence level. It seems larger firms and firms with a Big-4 auditor in the sample tend to have better corporate governance quality. Table 7 Panels B and C highlight whether corporate governance quality of PRC firms with a foreign primary listing differs significantly from the foreign market benchmarks. Equation 2 tests whether the corporate governance quality of HShare and Red-Chip Share firms differs from Hong Kong benchmark as predicted by H2a and H2b. As indicated in Table 7 Panel B, Equation 2 has pronounced goodness-of-fit (F<0.01) and the explanatory power is high of 50%. The coefficients on HSh i,t, RC i,t are insignificant. This is consistent with the expectation that corporate governance quality of H-Share and Red-Chip Share firms does not differ significantly from Hong Kong benchmark firms. Therefore, H2a and H2b are both supported. Meanwhile, in line with the t-test result, the coefficient on the PRCBch i,t is negatively significant. Table 7 Panel C reports regression results testing H2c using Equation 3. Whilst the overall goodness-of-fit of Equation 3 is consistently high, the explanatory power of the model is the highest among all models (adjusted R-Square 64%). The coefficient on the SSh i,t is negative, but statistically insignificant. This suggests that after controlling for firm characteristics, the corporate governance quality of S-Share firms does not vary significantly from the Singapore benchmark. H2c, thus, is also accepted. In addition, the coefficient on the PRCBch i,t is negatively significant which is consistent with the t-test results.
Regarding control variables, the coefficients on the firm age and auditor type are marginally significant in Equation 2 (p<0.1). Moreover, firm size and auditor type are significant in Equation 3, which have positive associations with the corporate governance quality at 1% and 5% confidence levels respectively.
Conclusion
The enduring systematic undertaking by firms from the People's Republic of China to establish a primary listing in a foreign rather than domestic jurisdiction is an interesting and worthy area of investigation. Empirical research associated with this phenomenon is very rare. Bonding theory (Coffee, 1999 (Coffee, , 2002 Stulz, 1999) claims that firms from a nation with poor investor protection seek listing on a foreign exchange to bond with the higher standards and distinguish themselves from the domestic peers. The PRC authorities have always claimed that one of the main purposes of the overseas listing is to lift up the corporate governance quality of PRC firms. It is thus imperative to have an understanding of the corporate governance practice of PRC foreign primary listing firms.
This paper examines whether a foreign primary listing is associated with corporate governance bonding of PRC firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore. Results suggest that in line with bonding theory (Coffee, 1999 (Coffee, , 2002 Stulz, 1999) , the average corporate governance quality of PRC firms with a foreign primary listing in Hong Kong (HShare, Red-Chip Share firms) and Singapore (SShare firms) is significantly higher relative to the PRC benchmark firms. In contrast, there is no significant difference between the corporate governance quality of H-Share and Red-Chip firms and the Hong Kong benchmark. Similarly, the corporate governance quality of S-Share firms does not vary significantly from the Singapore benchmark. Individual dimension analysis reveals the corporate govenance quality of PRC foreign primary listing firms mainly converges with the foreign market norms not only in terms of board characteristics but also in respect of board committee structure and mechanisms. Meanwhile, compared with PRC foreign primary listing firms, PRC benchmark firms mainly lag behind with regard to board committee structure and functioning.
Results from this paper support bonding theory and suggest that the tenet applies not only to cross listing but also to foreign primary listing. Findings from this research also indicate that Hong Kong and Singapore, as main platforms for PRC firms to gain international exposure, do play important roles in enhancing the corporate governance quality of PRC foreign primary listing firms. A possible explanation is the quality gap between the regulatory environments in Hong Kong, Singapore and the PRC is similar to the credibility gap between U.S. and other stock markets. Hong Kong and Singapore markets, therefore, can also provide legal and reputational bonding mechanisms to overseas listed PRC firms. Our findings have important implications for various interested parties. For instance, results from this study help international policy makers to understand the role of legal and governance mechanisms in converging firms' corporate governance practice to international standards. Meanwhile, conclusions from this paper also assist international investors in determining their investment strategies by evaluating the corporate governance of PRC firms listed in different markets.
It is acknowledged that cautions need to be executed when intepreting results from this paper. For example, the corporate governance score only considers items that are accessible from annual reports. PRC firms have long been criticised for the 'form over substance' approach to rules and regulations. Future research, therefore, could seek to explore further if the board effectiveness of PRC firms with a foreign primary listing is in line with foreign market norms by incorporating measures such as insider trading. Meanwhile, due to data constraints 55 , this paper does not provide time series evidence on the post foreign primary listing corporate governance change compared to the prior period. However, despite any caveats, this paper is the first that provides a comprehensive analysis of the corporate governance practice of a large sample of PRC foreign primary listing firms. Meanwhile, different from previous bonding studies based on [ 55 ] As PRC firms with a foreign primary listing were not publicly traded in the PRC before listing overseas, it is not possible to obtain corporate governance data prior to the foreign primary listings.
capital market evidence, this study provides direct evidence on the corporate governance bonding associated with PRC foreign primary listings. 
CGS2
If the chairman and the CEO of firmi in time period t are different people, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS3
If the proportion of independent directors on the board of firmi in time period t is greater than 50%, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS4
If the board of directors of firmi held four or more regular meetings during time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS5
If the independent directors on the board of firmi each personally attend at least 75% of all board meetings during time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
Board Characteristics
CGS6
If the number of members of the board of directors of firmi is between 6 and 12 in time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS7
If the board of directors of firmi adopts (or have adopted) during (applicable) time period t a formal code of conduct that deals with personal behavior of directors and key executives relating to insider trading, confidentiality, conflicts of interests and making use of corporate opportunities (property, information, position), then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS8
If the board of directors of firmi adopts (or have adopted) during (applicable) time period t a formal integrated risk management policy that deals with risk oversight and management and internal control, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS9
If the CEO/CFO of firmi states in the fiscal year report for time period t that the firm's risk management, internal compliance and control systems are operating effectively and efficiently then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS10
If firmi states in the fiscal year report for time period t that it (i.e., firmi) has a formal written continuous disclosure policy, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS11
If firmi publishes its annual report for time period t within 90 days of the end of fiscal year end for firmi then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
Board Disclosures
CGS12
If firmi states in the annual report for time period t the existence of a finance committee, charter or policy, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS13
If firmi establishes or has an established audit committee during time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS14
If the audit committee of firmi is chaired by independent director in time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS15
If all of members of the audit committee of firmi are independent directors during time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS16
If the audit committee of firmi has at least one serving independent member during period t identified as a financial accounting expert (i.e., possessing necessary educational qualifications and professional credentials in the field of accounting), then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS17
If firmi states in the fiscal year report for time period t that the audit committee has a charter, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
Audit Committee
CGS18
If the audit committee of firmi held four or more regular meetings during the time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS19
If firmi establishes or has an established nominating committee during time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
Nomination Committee
CGS20
If the nomination committee of firmi states in the annual report for time period t it (i.e., the nomination committee) has a policy for the appointment of directors, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS21
If firmi establishes or has an established remuneration (also termed compensation) committee during time period t, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
CGS22
If firmi states in the annual report for time period t the existence of a formal plan, policy or procedures with respect to equity (shares and options) based remuneration paid to directors and key executives, then a score of one [1] is given; otherwise a score of zero [0] is assigned.
Remuneration Committee
CGS23
If firmi states in the annual report for time period t the existence of a remuneration policy that outlines the link between remuneration paid to directors and key executives and corporate performance, then a score of one [1] Agei,t Number of days from the date of listing of firmi on its primary listing exchange to the end of financial year date of firmi for period t.
LnAgei,t Natural logarithm of the number of days from the date of listing of firmi on its primary listing exchange to the end of financial year date for the financial accounts of firmi for period t.
Indi,t
Indicator variable where firmi is scored one [1] if from the manufacturing industry as determined by SGX specifications for S-Share entities or industrial as determined by HKEx specifications for H-Share and Red-Chip entities at the end of time period t; other firmi scored zero [0].
ROAi,t
Average ratio of net profit after income tax and interest to total assets of firmi for time periods t, t-1 and t-2.
Audi,t
Indicator variable where firmi is scored one [1] if it engages a Big-4 audit firm as the auditor at financial year t; otherwise scored zero [0].
Levi,t
The average ratio of total liabilities to total assets of firmi for time periods t, t-1 and t-2.
Growthi,t
The average ratio of total assets growth from period t-2 to period t-1 and period t-1 to period t. 
